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losses on stocks occurred from over-staying the market, and
that it is better to sell out too soon than too late."
Surrogate Slater's conclusion in the Clark case is the culmina-
tion of a series of warnings expressed in a few recent decisions
through the medium of dicta. To this effect is the Matter of Chan-
ning,27 wherein the Court said, in considering such a discretion as we
are here concerned with:
"It is well to reiterate the caution frequently expressed in
this court that even in the face of this authority, vigilance and
alert judgment will be always required and the surcharging of
losses upon the trustee in future accountings is not beyond the
range of possibilities in spite of said authority."
The logic of the principle enunciated in the Clark case is per-
suasive. That a discretion vested in a trustee should be allowed to
pervert our every concept of a trustee is repugnant to the connotation
of justice. In spite of any discretion or permission, the trust company
was still a trustee.28 As such, it was bound to exercise that degree of
care and fidelity which the law required.2 9 Its failure so to act makes
its surcharging a necessary corollary.
JOSEPH A. SCHIAVONE.
LARCENY GENERICALLY, AND TIE OFFICE OF A BILL OF
PARTICULARS IN RESPECT TO AN INDICTMENT.*
In a recent opinion handed down by the Court of Appeals, the
Court again had occasion to discuss the meaning of larceny by trick,
and obtaining property by false pretense.' If the opinion in this case
merely discussed the definition of these two crimes, then the subject
could well be disregarded for it has been amply covered in the past by
judicial opinion and controversial legal literature.2 The decision, how-
129 Misc. 393, 394, 222 N. Y. Supp. 351 (1927); see Matter of Frank,
124 Misc. 664, 208 N. Y. Supp. 254 (1925).
:' Carrier v. Carrier, supra Note 23.
King v. Talbot, Matter of Hall, Costello v. Costello, all supra Note 2.
* Reprint from (1927) 1 St. John's L. Rev. 176, which issue is out of
circulation.
'People v. Noblett. 244 N. Y. 355 (1927).
- Thus, in Hilderbrand v. People, 56 N. Y. 394 (1874), the prosecuting
witness handed the prisoner, who was a bartender in a saloon, a fifty-dollar
bill to take ten cents out in payment for a soda. It was held that it was an
incomplete transaction, to be consummated in the presence of and under the
personal control of the complainant. The delivery of the bill and the change
were to be simultaneous acts, and until the latter was performed, the delivery
was not complete. The rule thus enunciated was further extended in a later
case, Justices of Court of Special Sessions v. People. 90 N. Y. 12 (1882),
where the same conclusion was reached, when the prosecuting witness gave the
prisoner a twenty-dollar bill and requested him to go out and get it changed, on
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ever, has new importance. Judge Crane, who dissented in that case,
scorned a decision which sets a criminal free because the defendant
was convicted of larceny by trick when, according "to an artificial
distinction," he should have been tried for obtaining property by
false pretenses. Judge Lehman, who spoke for the majority, seemed
the ground that the prosecutor intended to give up only his custody, but not
possession, for a special purpose.
Contra: In England it was decided, on almost the identical facts, that the
"prosecutor had divested himself, at the time of the taking of the entire posses-
sion of the money and that consequently there was not sufficient trespass to
constitute larceny." Reg. v. Reynolds, 2 Cox C. C. 170 (1847); Reg. v.
Thomas. 9 C. & P. 741 (1841).
It is submitted, however, that the New York Rule is the sounder one.
When the prosecuting witness turned over the bill and requested the prisoner
to go out and get it changed, the relation between them was substantially that
of master and servant, and a servant, having only the custody of the bill, is
guilty of larceny in converting it.
In State v. Walker, 65 Kan. 92, 68 Pac. 1085 (1902), a person gave to
another money to be changed into a different form and put in a letter to be
deposited in the post office. The one to whom it was given took the money.
made the change, put it in the letter, and, without mailing it, kept it and refused
to return it to the giver. It was held that the one who refused to complete the
direction given and the return of the money was guilty of larceny. In State
v. Marnes, 26 Wash. 160, 66 Pac. 431 (1901), goods were intrusted to another
to sbll, he to return the same or account therefor by producing the money
realized from their sale, retaining a certain per cent. as commission. It was
held that there was no relation of debtor and creditor and. on failure to account,
the agent is guilty of larceny. In Bailey v. State, 58 Ala. 414 (1877), where
one gave a ten-dollar bill in over-payment of a two-dollar debt and defendant
subsequently appropriated such over-payment to his own use on discovering the
mistake it was held to constitute larceny provided that the defendant had
knowledge of the mistake at the time it was made. This distinction is well
drawn in the case of Wilson v. People, 39 N. Y. 459 (1868). Accord: State v.
Williamson, Haust. Cri. Cases (Del.) 155 (1864); Farrell v. People, 16 Ill.
(6 Peck) 506 (1855) ; Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325 (1878) ; State
v. Ducker, 80 R. I. 394 (1880). Cf. Regina v. Hehir, 2 Ir. R. 709 (1895).
"Larceny and embezzlement belong to the same family of crimes; the
distinguishing feature being that to constitute larceny there must have been
a trespass or wrong to the possession, but where one gains possession of the
property so as to constitute only a bare charge, or custody, or procures it by
subterfuge, it does not divest the possession of the true owner; he is still in
constructive possession and the offense of appropriating the property is larceny."
Boswell v. State, 1 Ala. App. 178, 56 So. 21, 22 (1911) ; People v. Grider, 13
Col. App. 703. 118 Pac. 729 (1911) ; cf. Welch v. State, 126 Ga. 495, 55 S. D.
83 (1906). But see 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed., 1923), sec. 824 (2).
The distinction between larceny and false pretenses is, in the former the
owner of goods has no intention to part with his property therein, while in the
latter the owner does intend to part with his property, which intention is the
result of fraudulent contrivances. Zink v. People, 77 N. Y. 114 (1879), this
case may be distinguished from the cases of Smith v. People, 53 N. Y. 111
(1873); Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876), and Hilderbrand v. People,
56 N. Y. 394 (1874) ; in that in those cases the complainant gave up his custody
for a special purpose while in the principal case the prisoner was vested with
the indicia of ownership, an order bill of lading on which he paid the freight.
People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 503 (1887), decided after the passage of the Penal
Code, made the same distinction between larceny and obtaining property by
false pretenses.
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to sympathize with Judge Crane's views. He held, however, that the
change must be made by Legislative Enactment and not by judicial
decision for courts cannot disregard the plain import of the larceny
statute in order to hold a person who apparently had committed a
crime. If propriety could be placed on wings, one might be tempted
not only to disagree with Judge Crane, but, also, to reject the sym-
pathy that Judge Lehman declares for the view expressed by his
dissenting brother.
3
At early common law, to constitute the crime of larceny, there
had to be a felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods
of another.4 This rule obtained until the year 1779 when larceny by
trick and device first came into the law. In the 'famous case of King
v. Pear,5 the defendant obtained a horse from the prosecuting witness
and agreed to return it one week later. In fact, the defendant intended
to convert the horse to his own use. For the first time, it was held
that if a person is induced to surrender to another the right to posses-
sion of his property through the perpetration of a trick or device, the
wrong-doer has committed larceny. The Court apparently proceeded
on the theory that the owner would not have surrendered possession
but for the fraud of the wrong-doer, and, therefore, the Court
reached the conclusion that the law should treat such a situation as
though possession had been obtained through a wrongful taking. Of
course, this argument is unsound in theory and a myriad of cases in
the law of sales declared a contrary rule.6 Nevertheless, forever
' People v. Noblett, supra Note 1, per Lehman, J.: "Narrow technical dis-
tinctions by which a wrong-doer may escape the consequences of a crime hinder
the administration of justice. The courts which administer the law fail to
function properly when the penalty which the law has placed upon the com-
mission of a crime may be evaded by the proveti criminal through subtle reason-
ing based on obsolete theory. These are truisms, which should require no
repetition, but they may not lead the court to create a new definition of a
particular crime because judges may believe that the limits previously fixed are
too narrow. It is the function of the Legislature to determine whether modem
conditions dictate a wider definition of acts which subject the wrong-doer to
criminal responsibility. We may not assume that function even where the
established definition of crime may be based upon distinctions which seem at
the present time inconsequential. We may not hold that acts come within such
definition which, under recognized authority, have been hitherto included."
'Rex. v. Raven, Kel. 224 (1663).
"All felony includes trespass, and every indictment of larceny must have
the words felniice cepit, as well as asportavit; from whence it follows, that if
the party be guilty of no trespass in taking the goods, he cannot be guilty of
felony in carrying them away." 1 Hawkens P. C., ch. 33, par. 2.
'King v. Pear, 2 East P. C. 685 (1779).
6 It has long been held in the law of sales that a contract tainted with fraud
by the buyer (what might reasonably be called "trick and device by the prisoner
in the criminal law) is merely voidable, and not void. Hunter v. Hudson River
Iron, etc., Co., 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 493 (1855) ; Matteawan Co. v. Bently, 13 Barb.
(N. Y.) 641 (1852); Pikes Peak Paint Co. v. Mansury, 19 Cal. App. 286,
74 Pac. 796 (1903) ; Fleming v. Hanley, 21 R. I. 141, 42 Atl. 520 (1899).
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after, the name "larceny by trick or device" was given to those cases
where the owner of the property was induced to make a voluntary
surrender of possession because of some simulation concocted by the
wrong-doer to obtain possession to distinguish these cases where the
possession is obtained by the wrong-doer through a wrongful taking
from those where possession is obtained by trick, learned writers gave
to the original category the name of "larceny by trespass." 7
The generic term "larceny" thereafter embraced the cases of
larceny by trespass and larceny by trick or device. To this day the
distinction exists in the law. When possession is obtained through a
wrongful taking, it constitutes larceny by trespass. When possession
is obtained through artifice, it constitutes larceny by trick or device.
In 1799, embezzlement first came into the law. The Court having
declared in Rex v. Bazeley, 8 that it did not constitute crime for a
servant to convert the property of his master which the servant
obtained from a third party, the English Parliament passed a statute
making embezzlement a crime.9
There are other situations that sound in larceny, and yet do not
come within the technical meaning of that term. It should be remem-
bered that, originally, larceny meant taking property of another by
trespass. It was the opinion of English people that the law cannot
protect human beings who fail to take the proper caution to protect
themselves. As indicated, larceny by trick came many years after
larceny by trespass had become firmly established.
A fourth situation was presented by those cases where a person
with criminal intention held himself out as a prospective purchaser
and where the owner of personal property, not knowing of the
scheme, made a sale of his merchandise to one who never had the
intention to pay therefor. 10 The courts could not hold this to be
In Nichols v. Pinner, 18 N. Y. 295, 306 (1858), it was held, "But on the
other hand, if the purchase was made with the dishonest purpose of subjecting
the goods to the payment of other debts, thus defrauding the plaintiffs, tie sale
was voidable * * "
Since a voidable title presupposes at least a legal possession in the begin-
ning, it is inconceivable how it can be said that in case of larceny by trick and
device the possession is wrongful. It may only be explained by calling such a
finding a fiction of the law.
I "Some other crime, where there is no trespass, therefore no larceny, may
be constituted by the transaction." 2 Bish. Crim. Law (9th ed., 1923),
sec. 800 (1).8 Rex. v. Bazeley, 2 Leach (4th ed.) 835 (1799).
'39 George, Ill., ch. 85.
" In Regina v. Slowly. 12 Cox C. C. 269 (1873), the complainant unloaded
some onions at a place designated by the defendant, relying upon his statement
that "you shall have your money directly the onions are unloaded," when, in
fact, there never was any intention of paying therefor. The defendant was held
guilty of larceny since the passing of title to the onions and payment for them
were intended to be simultaneous, and, until the payment was made, delivery
was incomplete. The Court also said that if it had been intended by the
.prosecutor to give credit for the price of the onions even for a single hour it
would not have been larceny. To the same effect is the case of Queen v.
Russett, 2 Q. B. D. 312 (1892); Shippley v. People, 86 N. Y. 375 (1881).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
larceny by trespass because the property was voluntarily surrendered.
The owner had completely divested himself of every indicia of owner-
ship and not merely of bare possession. To remedy that situation,
the statute of 30 George II1 was passed. This statute was consid-
ered to extend to every case where a party had obtained money or
property by falsely representing himself to be in a situation in which
he was not. This statute is really the forerunner of our present
statutes with regard to obtaining property by false pretenses. 12
As the law now stands, there are four situations on which Gov-
ernment can lay an indictment. First, where a person wrongfully
takes the property of another. That we call larceny by trespass. Sec-
ond, where a person induces an owner to surrender mere possession
to him through trick or device; as for instance, when a person obtains
property under a bailment arrangement, when, in fact, the purported
bailee never intends to return the property but intends to convert it to
his own use. That we call larceny by trick or device. The third
classification includes those cases in which a person who is either an
attorney, trustee or a servant, who receives property from a third
person for his master, comes rightfully into possession of property,
but after receiving possession, converts the property to his own use.
That we call embezzlement.' 3 In the fourth category are those cases
But see Thorn v. Truck, 94 N. Y. 90 (1883) : "Where'one is induced to part
with his property by fraudulent means, but he actually intended to part with it
and delivered up possession absolutely, it is not larceny."
' 30 George II.
'Penal Code, sec. 1290:
A person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his prop-
erty, or the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the
taker, or of any other person:
Takes from the possession of the true owner, or of any other person; or
obtains from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false pretense or
representation, or of any false token or writing; or secretes, withholds, or
appropriates to his own use, or that of any other person other than the true
owner, any money, personal property, thing in action, evidence of debt or con-
tract. or article of value of any kind;
Steals such property, and is guilty of larceny.
'" However, in connection with this classification it should be noted that
different situations might arise in which the question of possession is the con-
trolling factor and, as Blackstone tersely sums up, "But if he had not the posses-
sion but only the care and oversight of the goods, as the butler of the plate, the
shepherd of the sheep, and the like, the embezzling of them is felony at common
law." 4 Black Comm. 230, 231.
So, in Crocheron v. State, 86 Ala. 64, 5 So. 649 (1888), the prosecuting
witness hired the prisoner as a farm hand. The prisoner was given the custody
of a mule daily in order to plow a field and one day he failed to return the
mule, having converted it to his own use. It was held, "That the prosecutor
had parted only with the custody of the animal, as distinguished from possession.
which was still in him as owner, although the prisoner had the custody as a
mere employee or servant. It has often been decided, and is -now settled law,
that goods in the bare charge or custody of a servant are legally in the posses-
sion of the master, and the servant may be guilty of trespass and larceny by
the fraudulent conversion of such goods to his own use." 2 Bishop, Criminal
Law (7th ed.), ch. 1, sec. 639.
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in which a wrong-doer induces the owner of property to give to him
not only possession, but also title, and the owner is induced to part
with title through the fraud of the wrong-doer. That we call obtain-
ing property by false pretenses. 14
Difficulty at times arises in cases dealing with larceny by trick and
obtaining property under false pretenses. It has been urged that the
distinction between the two crimes is so technical that a statute should
be passed not merely consolidating the two crimes, as New York
State has already done, but at the same time to give by statute dis-
cretion to the trial Court to charge the jury on any one of the four
crimes regardless of the evidence adduced, even where the indictment
charges common law larceny. If this subject were merely viewed on
the technical basis that writers have urged, there would perhaps be
reason to make this change in our law. Larceny by trick means that
the wrong-doer obtained possession through artifice. Obtaining prop-
erty under false pretenses means obtaining not only possession but
also title to the property through some scheme.
It was urged in the Noblett case as well as by the late Professor
Gifford,15 that since the distinction is between obtaining bare posses-
sion on the one hand and possession and title on the other, that there
is no fundamental distinction in the two crimes. Instead of viewing
But when a third party delivers a chattel to the servant of another, in such
a case, converting the chattel to his own use, before some act of appropriation
which would tend to reduce to the possession of the master, the servant is guilty
of embezzlement. Thus, in Regina v. Reed, 6 Cox C. C. 284 (1854), "there can
be no doubt that, in such a case, the goods must have been in the actual or
constructive possession of the master: and that, if the master had not otherwise
possession of them than by the bare receipt of his servant upon the delivery of
another for the master's use, although as against third persons this is in law a
receipt of the goods by the master, yet in respect of the servant himself, this
will not support a charge of larceny, because as to him there was no tortious
taking in the first instance, and consequently no trespass * * *. But if the
servant has done anything which determines his original exclusive possession of
the goods, so that the master thereby comes constructively into possession, and
the servant afterwards converts them aninto furandi, he is guilty of larceny,
and not merely of a breach of trust at common law, or of embezzlement under
the statute * * * that this exclusive possession was determined when the coals
were deposited in the prosecutor's cart. in the same manner as if they had been
deposited in the prosecutor's cellar of which the prisoner had charge."
Hatcher v. State. 74 Fla. 112, 476 So. 694 (1917) ; Rhode v. United States,
34 App. D. C. 249 (1910) ; Barrow v. State, 126 Ga. 92, 54 S. E. 812 (1906);
State v. Coster, 170 Mo. App. 539. 157 S. W. 85 (1913).
No doubt a final deposit of money in the till of a shop would have the same
effect. Waite's case, 2 East P. C. 570, 571 (1779); Bull's case, 2 East P. C.
572 (1779). But "if the prisoner before he placed the money in the drawer,
intended to appropriate it, and with that intent simply put it in the drawer for
his own convenience in keeping it for himself, that would not make his appro-
priation of it, just afterward, larceny."
Commonwealth v. Ryan. 155 Mass. 523, 30 N. E. 354 (1892); Sloan v.
Merrill, 135 Mass. 17 (1883) ; Jeffords v. Alvard, 151 Mass. 94. 23 N. E. 734
(1890) ; Commonwealth v. Drew, 153 Mass. 588, 27 N. E. 593 (1891).
" Supra Note 2.
" (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 318.
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this situation in terms of possession and title, it would be well to try
and visualize the situation as it actually appears in court. A man is
indicted for having stolen property. By our traditions, he is presumed
innocent until his guilt is established. Under our law an indictment is
not evidence that the defendant is guilty of the crime with which he
is charged. Has a person so situated the legal and moral right to
demand that he be told whether he is charged merely with obtaining
the use of personal property of another through fraud or whether he
is charged with having bought the property without the intention to
pay? It would seem that the difference existing in -those two situa-
tions is fundamental. Year after year, hundreds of cases are tried
under the General Larceny Statute and courts and district attorneys
seem to know -the difference in the fundamental concept that exists
between larceny by trick and obtaining property under false pretenses.
Every ten or fifteen years an error is committed and then writers andjudges urge that obsolete decisions lead to a miscarriage of justice
when a man who has committed a crime is set free because of tech-
nical rules.16 It would seem wiser to permit these rare cases to occur
6 People v. Noblett, supra Note 1.
Although such errors sometimes creep in and lead to a miscarriage ofjustice, the opposite is sometimes true, and the meaning of the different phases
of larceny is stretched to prevent a travesty on justice. Thus, in People v.
Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902), the prisoner, by a representation or
promise to pay a dividend of ten per cent. weekly until the deposit was with-
drawn, induced and duped a large number of people to invest their moneys with
him. These moneys were to be used by a syndicate for speculative purposes
and under a guaranty that they would be returned at any time at one week's
notice. In fact, the syndicate was never formed and the money never invested.
The Court held, reversing the ruling of the Appellate Division that the
"depositor" never intended to pass title to the moneys so deposited. The pros-
ecuting witness (depositor) intended to part only with the manual custody of
the moneys so delivered, unless or until the moneys were used for the purpose
for which they were delivered, delivery was incomplete and title did not pass.
This arbitrary ruling may be explained only by a careful scrutiny of the factspresented, inasmuch as the judges themselves inferred that a conviction for
obtaining money under false pretenses would have been highly improbable, and
to allow the prisoner to escape unpunished, because of some technicality of the
law, would be a travesty on justice.
While it is conceded that in view of the facts of the case the holding is ajust one, yet it is submitted that it is technically unsound. In the ordinary course
of business, one who has complete control over money, who is to use it or not
as he sees fit, obligated only to pay dividends and return the money on notice.
who bears the loss in case of robbery, etc., stands in the position of a debtor to
the original owner of the money and to all intents and purposes is the owner
thereof, not merely the custodian. The Appellate Division, in reversing the
conviction at the trial term per Hirschberg, 1., 64 App. Div. 450-458 (2nd
Dept., 1901) : "She [complainant] intended to give the prisoner her money to
gamble with in his own name if he saw fit, only stipulating that she should
receive the interest for the use of the money and to be repaid upon demand.
The money was not delivered for any special purpose, or to be used or invested
in any way for her. It was his money * * *. In other words, she did not
intend to vest the prisoner with the mere naked custody and possession of the
money for safe keeping * * * she gave it to him so that he might gamble with
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rather than to deny to a person the right that it is proclaimed exists
in our criminal law, that a person charged with crime is entitled to
know the crime with which he is charged before he is called upon to
make his defense.17
In the Noblett case, the facts appeared to be that in March, 1926,
the defendant was the tenant of an apartment on Riverside Drive in
the city of New York. The term of his lease had expired, but the
right of occupation and possession continued under the statutes known
as the Rent Laws. He inserted an advertisement in the New York
Times offering to sub-rent by month or year his furnished apartment.
The complaining witness read the advertisement on March 12. He
communicated with the defendant and, pursuant to appointment, met
the defendant at his apartment. On the following morning, the com-
plaining witness paid the defendant a sum of money which repre-
sented the agreed rental, but he did not receive possession of the
apartment which defendant agreed to rent to him, either on the day
when the contract was made or at any other time.
On these facts it would seem obvious that when the complaining
witness gave to the defendant the sum which was supposed to repre-
sent the rental for the apartment, he intended that the defendant
would have that money as his own and that the complaining witness
in return would receive possession of the apartment. Actually it is
admitted that the defendant never intended to give to this complain-
ing witness the possession of the apartment; that the defendant
intended to obtain this money and wrongfully convert it to his own
use. It, nevertheless, is true that when the complaining witness sur-
it in Wall Street as he saw fit and expected interest for the use of the money,
whether he lost or not * * *"
In the Noblett case, supra, the Court attempted to distinguish the case from
the Miller case, supra, in saying: "The owner parted with possession of the
property only for the purpose of enabling the prisoner to effectuate some specific
benefit in favor of the owner, whereas in the principal case [Noblett], the owner
parted absolutely with all control of the money and vested in the prisoner the
complete right to use it for his own purpose and benefit, relying upon the
prisoner's promise to transfer in the future the stipulated consideration for the
money." This distinction may well be regarded as arbitrary as the holding in
the Miller case.
"
TThe proper office of a bill of particulars is to enlighten the defendant as
to charges made against him so as to enable him to prepare a defense. It does
not have to disclose the nature of the plaintiff's case. Matthews v. Hubbard,
47 N. Y. 428 (1872); Stern v. Wabash R. R. Co., 98 App. Div. 619 (1st Dept.,
1904). There is no fixed and inflexible rule as to when a party is entitled to a
bill of particulars. The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, in a
case where a party cannot properly prepare for trial or justice cannot be done
unless he is notified of the charges against him, order the submission of a bill
of particulars. Cunard v. Franklyn, 111 N. Y. 511, 19 N. E. 92 (1888)
Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176 (1874).
As a general rule the effect of a bill of particulars is to restrict the sub-
mitter thereof in the nature of his proofs. His evidence must fall within the
allegations of the bill of particulars. St. Albans Beef Co. v. Aldridge, 112
App. Div. 803 (3rd Dept., 1906); Murray v. Mabie, 8 N. Y. Supp. 289 (5th
Dept., 1889). Contra: Massachusetts Rules, infra Note 25.
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rendered this sum to the defendant, he parted with title to it. He
intended that that money should thereafter be the money of the
defendant. It is conceded that if the complaining witness had known
of this scheme concocted by the defendant, he never would have
surrendered the money to him, but, under the arrangement, the
defendant was to have the money and the complaining witness was to
receive the possession of the apartment. If the defendant was to have
the money, then title passed to the defendant and he would be amen-
able to the statute with regard to obtaining money under false
pretenses.
The indictment against the defendant contained two counts. The
first count charged, in effect, that the defendant obtained the sum of
$550 from the complaining witness by false and fraudulent pretenses.
The second count charged the defendant with committing larceny by
trick. The trial took place; the Government rested; and then both dis-
trict attorney and trial Court could not decide whether the evidence
adduced would support the first count of the indictment which charged
the obtaining of money under false pretenses, or whether the evidence
in the case would sustain the second count of the indictment which
charged larceny by trick. Quite a good deal of time was spent by
Court and district attorney discussing this aspect of the case. Finally
a choice had to be made and the trial Court decided that this evidence
would sustain the second count of the indictment which charged
larceny by trick.
It would seem that any person conversant with the fundamental
concepts of criminal law would have known that this evidence could
not sustain the second count of the indictment which charged larceny
by trick; that this evidence clearly sustained -the first count of the
indictment which charged obtaining money by false pretenses.
The trial Court, having decided that this evidence supported the
second count of the indictment, dismissed the first count and then
charged the jury with regard to larceny by trick. Defendant was
found to be guilty and judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals, Crane, J. and Andrew, J., dissenting,
reversed the judgment and dismissed the indictment. Judge Lehman.
who wrote for the majority, bemoans the fact that a wrong-doer
escapes punishment because of technical distinctions in the law, but
declares that "it is the function of the Legislature to determine
whether modern conditions dictate a wider distinction of acts which
should subject the wrong-doer to criminal responsibility." 18
Judge Crane, in his dissenting opinion, urges that since under
the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is sufficient if the indictment con-
tains a plain and concise statement of the acts constituting the crime,
19 Supra Note 3.
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that this conviction should therefore be sustained. 19 Judge Crane
apparently views this as a matter of proper wording of an indictment.
It should be remembered that, in this case, the defendant was charged
in two counts; that the Government under the indictment could
adduce all its proof; that the Government was not compelled to make
an election until after it rested; and that at that late stage both Court
and district attorney could not decide whether the crime constituted
larceny by trick or obtaining money under false pretenses.
Judge Lehman, in his majority opinion, indicates improvements
-that have been made both in England 20 and in Massachusetts. 21
Under the English statute, the trial Court may in a proper case.
charge the jury with regard to the crime of larceny even though the
indictment was predicated on obtaining property by false pretense.
The late Professor Gifford likewise praises this improvement in
the law.22
It is submitted that both the courts and writers have overlooked
the fact that this statute merely enables the crown to adduce evidence
with regard to larceny when the indictment charges the defendant
with obtaining property under false pretenses. Under this English
statute a trial Court cannot charge a jury with regard to larceny
when the evidence can only support a charge with regard to false
pretense. The same difficulty that the Court of Appeals recently
" Code Criminal Procedure, sec. 275:
The indictment must contain:
(1) The title of the action, specifying the name of the court to which the
indictment is presented, and the name of the parties;
(2) A plain and concise statement of the acts constituting the crime,
without unnecessary repetition.
'England: In an indictment for embezzlement or fraudulent application
or disposition of property, the defendant may be found guilty of simple larceny,
or larceny as a clerk or servant or person employed in the public service or
police, and on an indictment for simple larceny the defendant may be found
guilty of embezzlement or fraudulent application or disposition of property.(Larceny Act. 1861, 24 and 25 Victoria, ch. 96. sec. 72). A defendant on an
indictment for false pretenses may be found guilty, even though it appears that
the offence amounted to larceny (ibid., sec. 88).
SMassachusetts: The court may, upon the arraignment of the defendant,
or at any later stage of the proceedings, order the prosecution to file a statement
of such particulars as may be necessary to give the defendant and the court
reasonable knowledge of the nature and grounds of the crime charged, and if it
has final jurisdiction of the crime, shall so order at the request of the defendant
if the charge would not be otherwise fully, plainly, substantially, and formally
set out. If there is a material variance between the evidence and the bill of
particulars, the court may order the bill of particulars to be amended, and may
postpone the trial. * * *. R. L. of 1902, ch. 218, sec. 39.
In an indictment for criminal dealing with personal property with intent to
steal, an allegation that the defendant stole said property shall be sufficient;
and such indictment may be supported by proof that the defendant committed
larceny of the property, or embezzled it, or obtained it by false pretenses.
R. L. of 1902, ch. 218, sec. 40-formerly Laws of 1899, ch. 409, sec. 12.
2-Sitpra Note 15.
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encountered in the Noblett case likewise appeared in England even
after the enactment of these statutes, and in Crown Cases Reserved a
conviction had to be quashed.23
Again both writers and judges are inclined to praise the Massa-
chusetts system. Under the Massachusetts Statute of 1899, it is suffi-
cient to charge in the indictment that the person accused did steal
without making the usual descriptive averments of asportation or
means used to obtain possession of the property, and larceny is defined
as "the criminal taking, obtaining or converting of personal property
with intent to defraud or deprive the owner permanently of the use
of it; including all forms of larceny, criminal embezzlement and
obtaining by criminal false pretenses."
Under R. L. C., chapter 218, subdivision 39,24 the defendant
is given the right to a bill of particulars but the statute gives the
Government the right to amend its bill even at the trial if the evidence
adduced should vary from the bill of particulars originally given.
The Massachusetts courts have interpreted this section to mean
that the granting of the bill no longer rests in the sound discretion of
the court but that instead the defendant can demand such a bill as a
matter of absolute right. 25
Therefore, the only advantage to be achieved from these Massa-
chusetts statutes which judges and learned writers praise, is that the
Government is not obliged to determine whether the facts will sup-
port larceny by trick or false pretense at the time when the indictment
is found. The indictment can be worded in general language, charg-
ing the defendant with stealing property. Under the laws of pro-
cedure of our state, the state can charge the defendant in four sep-
arate counts. 26  It can charge him in the first count with larceny by
Regina v. Solomons, 62 Law Times, 672.
'Supra Note 22.
Speaking of the right of the defendant to a bill of particulars, the Massa-
chusetts Court in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 317, 324, 68 N. E. 346-348(1903), makes the following statement: "This is a sufficient protection to the
accused. Indeed it is manifest that since under the former practice the right to
a bill of particulars was a matter that lay within the discretion of court and
therefore could not be claimed as of right. Commonwealth v. Wood. 4 Gray 11.
This statute, which makes the right to such a bill absolute, places the accused
in a better position than he was before."
Again, in Commonwealth v. McDonald, 187 Mass. 581, 585, 73 N. E.
852-853 (1905) : "If the defendant desired further information to enable him
to meet a more definite claim by the Government than was shown by its formal
allegations or more fully to make his defense, it was open to him as of right
to ask for specifications setting forth such additional facts. R. L., ch.
218, sec. 39. This statutory provision preserved his constitutional rights and
offered him ample protection from being misled or rendered unable to meet the
real accusation made against him."
But compare the New York Rule, supra Note 17.
26 Code Criminal Procedure, sec. 279: The crime may be charged in sep-
arate counts to have been committed in a different manner or by different
means; and where the acts complained of may constitute different crimes, such
crimes may be charged in separate counts.
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trespass; in the second count with larceny by trick; in the third count
with embezzlement, and in the fourth count with obtaining money
under false pretenses.
In the instant case, the indictment did contain two counts. The
defendant was charged under one count with false pretense. He was
charged in the second count with larceny by trick. Under the Massa-
chusetts Law, the district attorney may amend his bill of particulars
even at the trial. But the statute does not permit a judge to charge a
jury with regard to larceny when the evidence can only sustain a
charge of false pretense.
In the Noblett case, the district attorney was not called upon to
make a choice until the State had rested: How could the Massachu-
setts statute in any way affect the result in the instant case? Difficulty
arose only after the Government had rested, when Court and district
attorney could not determine which of the two counts the evidence
supported. As previously indicated, even after the statute of Victoria,
in Crown Cases Reserved, a conviction had to be quashed because the
Crown did not know the difference between false pretense and
larceny.27
Courts and writers seem to have forgotten that laws are not self-
executing and a statute cannot make them so. Consequently, if the
general views expressed by Judge Crane should be adopted it would
be insufficient to enact a statute formulated on the Massachusetts
plan. The change must be even more revolutionary. The act would
have to deny to a defendant the right to a bill of particulars even
though under the Massachusetts law the defendant can demand it as
of right. In substance, it would mean that only after the highest court
has decided on the law and the facts would a defendant know the
crime with which he had been charged, and of which he had been
found guilty. Probably no judge or student of the law would urge
so radical a change.
People v. Adler, 140 N. Y. 331, 35 N. E. 644 (1893) ; People v. McCarthy,
110 N. Y. 309, 18 N. E. 128 (1888); People v. Willson, 109 N. Y. 345, 16
N. E. 540 (1888). But in no event must the proof adduced vary from the
crime charged. Thus where the indictment charges one crime and the evidence
adduced proves another, such variance is fatal and the indictment must be
dismissed. People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 503 (1887); People v. Dunn, 6 N. Y.
Supp. 805 (1st Dept., 1889). In People v. Dumar, supra, the indictment
charged that the defendant "unlawfully and feloniously did steal, take and
carry away" the property described. It was held that the indictment could not
be sustained by proof that the defendant obtained possession of the property
from the owner upon a sale on credit induced by false and fraudulent represen-
tations. In People v. Dunn, supra, the indictment charged that the defendant
"did take, steal, and carry away" certain property. It was held that there was
no variance between the indictment and the proof which showed that the
defendant was a bank teller and had taken the money while in his custody. It
was also held not to be error in allowing the amendment of the indictment so
that it alleged the property belonged to the "President & Director of the
Manhattan Co." and not to the "Bank of Manhattan Co."
' Supra Note 23.
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These views, therefore, could not be adopted unless ancient tradi-
tion were completely repudiated. It would lead to the conclusion that
it would be wiser to proceed on the premise that every man who is
indicted is guilty of the charges set forth in the indictment, and then
to effectuate this theory, adopt the wisdom of the Queen in "Alice of
Wonderland"-we will have the execution first and the judgment
afterward.
WILLIAM EDELSON.
ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS.
With the growth of any profession or industry to economic im-
portance, there is a concomitant evolution in the law in its application
to that particular enterprise.' Basic principles of law remain the
same, but unforeseen situations demand new interpretations of old
rules. The profession of accountancy has provided us with a question
which, though possessing analogies in the law, has a flavor peculiar
to the auditing field. The increasing use of auditor's financial state-
ments and certificates as a basis for the extension of credit has led to
the query: What is the liability of an auditor who, in a statement, has
certified to the accuracy of the accounts of his client? Does the
accountant owe any duty of care to strangers who extend credit on
the faith of his certificate, or is his sole obligation a matter of con-
tract with his client?
A noted English accountant has said 2 of the auditor's responsi-
bility:
"Although the auditor is responsible primarily to the
shareholders, yet in the light of modern company development
a somewhat wider view should be taken, I think, by the auditor
himself. He should remember that balance sheets of public
companies are, for practical purposes, public documents; they
are studied by the stock exchange and the prospective investor
when forming an opinion as to the value of the share and the
debenture capital; are made available to traders as an indica-
tion of the financial stability, and they are used by the com-
panies themselves when raising bank loans and making other
financial arrangements."
Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 62.
2Plender, Accountant's Certificate in Connection with the Accountant's
Responsibility, J. of Accty., vol. 43, p. 253 (1926).
